We use a dataset of sell-side analysts' scenario-based equity valuation estimates to examine whether analysts are able to assess the risk surrounding a firm's fundamental value. We find that the spread in analysts' state-contingent valuations captures the riskiness of operations and predicts the absolute magnitude of future long-run valuation errors and changes in firm fundamentals (i.e., maps into the distribution of one-year-ahead price outcomes and changes in operating performance). Additionally, analysts' assessment of fundamental risk and predictive ability systematically shifted during and after the financial crisis, consistent with the macro-economic shock raising awareness among analysts of their firms' systematic risk exposures.
occurring, such as a shift in market demand, change in competitive landscape, the impact of a new product launch, regulatory change, a shift in macro-economic conditions, and a host of other economic events. This process creates a template by which analysts systematically assess, and inform their clients about, the jointly-determined risk factors and return potential surrounding the covered firm. Essentially, as the analyst outlines his/her beliefs about the firm's expected (i.e., base case) performance and value, they are also required to provide information that encapsulates the alternative upside and downside valuation outcomes that could occur with reasonable probabilities. This reporting process creates a parsimonious, state-dependent distribution of valuation outcomes for each covered firm.
We use the data embedded in the distribution of scenario-based valuation forecasts -namely, the spread between the analyst's forecasted upside and downside valuations (normalized as a percentage of the base case valuation) -to measure the analyst's expectations about the magnitude of uncertainty and state-contingent risk surrounding the firm's fundamental valuation. Our first set of analyses document firm-level characteristics associated with the analyst's assessment of long-term valuation risk and uncertainty; our second set of analyses focus on whether analysts accurately assess this fundamental valuation risk by examining the distribution of base case valuation errors and ex post operating performance innovations conditional upon their ex ante spread in the firms' scenario-based value estimates. Together, these tests have the potential to either confirm or cast doubt upon individual analyst's ability to assess fundamental risk and uncertainty about the covered firm's long-term valuation.
We find that the magnitude of the spread embedded in the analyst's scenario-based value estimates is significantly associated with firm characteristics that capture the fundamental riskiness of the firm's operations and shareholder's equity (e.g., beta, small size, financial distress, losses, and idiosyncratic risk). This association is consistent with equity analysts considering firm-specific risk attributes when assessing state-contingent risk and creating scenario-based valuation models. We also find that the magnitude of these risk assessments is decreasing in the amount of analyst optimism embedded in the analyst's base case valuation forecast. This inverse relation suggests that an optimistic bias impacts the analyst's assessment of both the firm's expected payoff and the riskiness of that payoff.
In terms of predictive ability, we find that the magnitude of the spread across the analyst's scenario-based valuation estimates is positively related to the absolute magnitude of future long-run unanticipated return outcomes (i.e., absolute base case valuation errors). These predictive relations are robust to the exclusion of reports issued in advance of or during the height of the financial crisis period, incremental to commonly used measures of analyst disagreement about future performance (i.e., analyst forecast dispersion) and target price optimism, and various controls for innate firm characteristics at the report date. Moreover, the positive association between the spread in analyst valuations and absolute magnitude of future pricing errors is driven by analysts' ability to predict economic shocks to firm fundamentals --ex ante valuation spreads are positively related to ex post changes in the covered firm's future financial performance (absolute changes in ROE, operating margin, and revenue growth), mirroring the relation between ex ante valuation spreads and long-run valuation errors. Essentially, a change in the state of the world manifests itself as a shock to the firm's fundamentals, which drives stock price and firm value away from the analyst's original base case valuation and towards an alternative bull case or bear case scenario reflected in the analyst's investment report.
Our final set of analyses examines analyst behavior around the recent financial crisis. Very little is known about how analysts' respond to macro-economic shocks or, more generally, assess and respond to variability in firm performance. We exploit the financial crisis as both an exogenous shock to firm fundamentals and a shift in the nature of risk affecting firm performance (from idiosyncratic to systemic).
We use this unique setting to determine whether the manifestation of systemic, state-contingent risk impacts analysts' subsequent risk-return assessments. We find that the financial crisis systematically impacted both analysts' assessment of the risk-return tradeoff in their scenario-based valuations and the predictive nature of these valuations. First, we find that analysts ex ante assessments of state-contingent risk (i.e., the spread in their scenario-based valuations) widen during the crisis in response to the uncertainty created by the event. Second, and more importantly, analysts' assessments of state-contingent risk display a significantly stronger relation with the firm's systematic risk exposure (i.e., beta) and a significantly weaker relation with base case optimism after the event than before. In other words, analysts learned from the crisis, with risk-return assessments made after the crisis placing a greater weight on the firm's systematic risk exposure. Finally, in terms of predictability, we find that the absolute magnitude of base case valuation errors are significantly smaller and more strongly correlated with the analysts' ex ante assessments of risk after the financial crisis than before. Together, the evidence suggests that analysts responded to the recent macro-economic shock by placing greater (less) emphasis on risk (non-risk, behavioral) factors in their scenario-based valuations, and that these changes improved their ability to assess both firm value and the firm's risk-return attributes.
Our paper provides several important contributions. First, we provide the first evidence on how sophisticated market participants assess and incorporate state-contingent risk and outcome uncertainty into their valuation models through the use of new publicly available data. Our finding that analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates both reflect and convey information about the long-term risks and return potential affecting the value of the covered firm contributes to a small set of papers examining the ability of financial analysts to assess the riskiness of equity securities (e.g., Lui, Markov, and Tamayo, 2007; . Second, our focus on the analyst's explicit assessment of the second moment of future oneyear-ahead value outcomes, as captured by their reported distribution of scenario-based valuations, is novel to the literature. The long-term, state-dependent risk-reward assessments explored in this paper are both conceptually and empirically different from the categorical risk ratings, daily price volatility and factor loading outcomes explored in prior work. Moreover, by documenting a link between these ex ante assessments and ex post shocks to firm fundamentals, we provide clarity on the mechanism by which these risk assessments and future valuation errors are related. Third, by exploiting the financial crisis, we document how sophisticated financial intermediaries respond to the revelation of risk and uncertainty created by large macro-economic shocks. The documentation of two complimentary effects -a greater emphasis on risk factors and the elimination of analyst optimism -supports behavioral arguments that judgments are influenced by the recency of past events. Fourth, we develop and examine a new empirical proxy for the level of uncertainty about a firm's fundamental value. This metric, the spread between bull and bear case valuation scenarios, addresses concerns surrounding the use of another commonly used metric, analyst forecast dispersion (see Johnson, 2004) , and is a better predictor of the distribution of future long-term price outcomes. Fifth, we document that the information contained in the distribution of scenario-based valuations is a better predictor of variance of long-term price outcomes than the categorical risk measure historically issued by the same analyst for the same firm. Lastly, the descriptive data presented in the paper raises questions about the influence of behavioral biases on an analyst's assessment of a firm's riskiness and return potential.
Background and motivation

Background on the Morgan Stanley Risk-Reward Framework
The data used in our study are drawn from state-contingent valuation estimates made by Morgan Stanley analysts in their published investments reports. Weyns, Perez and Jenkins (2007) describe Morgan Stanley's "risk-reward framework," the approach towards fundamental research that underpins the firm's equity investment analyses. 3 In the traditional framework, analysts at most major brokerage firms provide equity investment recommendations (e.g., "buy", "hold", "sell") based principally upon the anticipated, or expected, appreciation or depreciation in the firm's stock price in the near term. These recommendations are supported by a single point target price forecast, frequently derived from a fundamentals-based analysis of the company's intrinsic value and its projected future cash flows. The risk-reward framework requires analysts to expand their analyses to present both bull and bear case valuation scenarios, in addition to the analyst's base case expectations for the company's stock price, over the following 12 months.
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To generate these three scenarios, the analysts are asked to extract information about firm risk from their fundamental analysis, with the goal of providing a "band of uncertainty" around the valuation of a particular stock. During this analysis, the analysts are expected to (1) identify a company's key business drivers; (2) identify the metrics affecting those drivers; and (3) predict the impact of likely changes in those metrics on target company performance and firm value. The three cases are expected to represent the full range of plausible outcomes over the forecast horizon. By mandating a probabilistic state-contingent view of equity values, Morgan Stanley has created a standardized platform for their analysts to formally integrate fundamental risk and valuation uncertainty into their analysis.
The framework provides a forward-looking measure of the firm's long-run risk-return tradeoff through the direct incorporation of "forward-looking, nuts-and-bolts information on the alternative paths that a company's value drivers might follow in the near to medium-term." (Weyns, Perez and Jenkins, 2007 ; page 2). This risk-reward view of a stock includes "the analyst's choice of critical uncertainties, the assumptions underpinning various scenarios, and an implicit or explicit assessment of the relative likelihoods of different outcomes" (Weyns, Perez and Jenkins, 2007; page 5) . The analysts are not, however, required to provide an explicit confidence interval within which the stock price is expected to fall with a given likelihood because a fundamentals-driven risk-reward approach does not produce a continuous probability distribution of value. Instead, analysts can present their conviction on their outlook by either tightening or loosening the range between bull and bear scenarios.
An example of the scenario-based valuation estimates created under the risk-return framework is presented in Appendix 2. 5 As illustrated in this excerpt from Morgan Stanley's research report dated
October 21, 2010 on Netflix, the analyst has forecasted a per-share value of the company's equity under three different economic scenarios, corresponding roughly to three alterative competitive outcomes for
Netflix's business model and industry. The base case scenario reflects the analyst's mean expectations for the company, in this instance, forecasting continued strength for the company's business model and continued growth. The bull case scenario estimates firm value conditional upon Netflix maintaining its strong competitive position and engaging in substantial international expansion. The bear case captures the risk associated with enhanced competition from digital download providers and kiosk vendors and associated margin compression. The output from analyst reports using this "risk-reward" framework forms the dataset used in our study.
Related research and motivation
Despite an early call for research on analyst's ability to assess firm risk (Zmijewski, 1993 ; page 337), such research is scare. This scarcity is driven by a lack of formal risk assessments in most analyst investment reports; however, historical exceptions exist. In the only set of published studies directly examining this issue, Lui, Markov and Tamayo (2007; examine risk ratings issued by Salomon Smith Barney and Citigroup over the period 1997-2003 and 1999-2006, respectively. 6 Focusing on analysts' ability to assess and predict daily excess stock price volatility, Lui et al (2007) find that firm characteristics such as high leverage, high book-to-market ratio, low market capitalization, losses and lower earnings quality are significant determinants of the analysts' risk ratings, with idiosyncratic risk a more important determinant of analyst risk assessment than beta or illiquidity. They find that risk ratings explain around half of the cross sectional variation in future daily excess return volatility and that these ratings provide incremental information over and above other predictions future daily stock return volatility. Building on these findings, Lui et al (2012) examine the market's response to changes in Citigroup's equity risk ratings. The authors find strong evidence that changes in equity risk ratings, although infrequent in occurrence, convey significant new information to the market, both in absolute terms and relative to credit ratings changes. Moreover, changes in equity risk ratings are associated with a subsequent shift in Fama-French factor loadings, suggesting that analyst's revision conveyed timely information about a change in the firm's fundamental risk factors.
We view an analysis of analysts' state-contingent valuation estimates as a natural complement to, yet distinct from, the extant literature on risk ratings. First, assessing the firm's fundamental payoff risks and providing information about the potential distribution of long run, state-contingent valuation outcomes is fundamentally different from the act of assigning a categorical risk rating that comingles price and fundamental risk. This difference relates, principally, to the nature and horizon of the risk being assessed. The risk ratings historically employed by analysts seem to reflect both fundamental and price risk, and empirically, convey information about the degree of a firm's sensitivity to daily stock return volatility and/or various empirical risk factors. Given their focus on price volatility, the rating provide only limited, indirect guidance about the range over which the firm's price and potential changes in firm fundamentals. In contrast, scenario-based valuations focus on fundamental risk alone. These valuations convey detailed, contextual and directional information about the source and nature of the joint risk-return tradeoffs associated with a given investment opportunity with a long-term (one year) focus. The approach requires the analyst to provide explicit guidance about the potential range for the firm's long-term value, and allows for a direct examination of whether the assessments of fundamental risk maps into ex post changes in firm fundamentals. 
Ex post accuracy of analyst's base-case valuation
The ex post accuracy of the analyst's base case valuation estimate is assessed by comparing this valuation estimate against the subsequent price of the firm one year after the issuance of the analyst report. We define the variable Unanticipated Return i,t as the closing equity share price of the firm 365 days after report issuance (adjusted for stock splits) minus the analyst's base case value estimate (i.e., Base i,t ), scaled by the firm's closing price the day before the report's issuance (i.e., Price i,t ). As defined, 12 In this context, the anticipated return to the security directly corresponds to the expected appreciation or depreciation in the firm's stock price over the one-year forecast horizon (i.e., capital gain or loss portion of the investors' total return). In the valuation context, the analyst is explicitly forecasting a one-year-ahead stock price outcome, and is not forecasting cum dividend returns to the investor. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our sample of scenario-based valuation estimates.
Descriptive evidence on analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates
Focusing on the complete sample of firm-quarter reports (Panel A), we find that the mean (median) report forecasts 15.9% (12.2%) appreciation in the firm's stock price over the analyst's forecast horizon (i.e.,
Base Return i,t ), with 79.5% of the firms are projected to experience some price appreciation over that period. This pattern of positive base-case returns is consistent with positive mean expected and realized returns for the market over long horizons, with analysts selectively covering firms with strong historical price performance (i.e., positive momentum stocks), strong growth prospects, and high valuation multiples (Stickel, 1995; McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) , and with the previously documented optimistic bias in target prices (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005) .
In terms of the characteristics of the analyst's state-dependent valuation scenarios, the mean (median) forecasted return under bull scenario conditions (i.e., Bull Return i,t ) is 53.4% (41.8%), while the mean (median) forecasted return under bear scenarios conditions (i.e., Bear Return i,t ) is -27.0% (-24.7%).
There is also considerable cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of returns generated under these potential upside and downside scenarios; extreme bull case scenarios generate returns exceeding 240%
and extreme bear case scenarios generate losses of 100%. The observed variation in these statecontingent valuation outcomes suggests that analysts' scenario-based valuations reflect highly contextualized analyses and incorporate a diverse set of firm, industry, and macro-economic factors.
These contextual valuations translate into considerable cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the spread between the analysts' bull case and bear case scenario-based valuation estimates in our sample of firm-quarter reports. In terms of the ex post accuracy of the analysts' base case valuation estimates, we find that the mean (median) security under-performs the return implied by base case expectations by approximately 6.2% (8.7%) over the subsequent year (i.e., unanticipated returns). This mean underperformance (i.e., negative valuation error) is consistent with the previously documented optimistic bias in analyst's target prices (e.g., Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005) . In terms of absolute valuation errors, the mean (median) Panel C present mean descriptive statistics on the attributes of these scenario-based forecasts by quarter over our sample period. As expected, there is considerable variation over time. Over our sample period, Spread i,t realizations are substantially larger at the start of the financial crisis and economic downturn (Q4 2008, Q1 2009 and Q2 2009) , as the shock to credit markets damped down consumer demand and consumption and created significant uncertainty about future economic conditions and firm payoffs. The univariate evidence also documents a shift in both the mean Spread i,t contained in these scenario based valuations and in the ex post degree of degree analyst optimism following the financial crisis, suggesting that the financial crisis shock may have altered how analysts' assessed and valued state-continent risk / uncertainty. Given this systematic variation in the data, we include fixed effects for both industry and year-quarters in all of our multivariate analyses. More importantly, additional tests will exploit the financial crisis shock to examine how a systematic, state-contingent shock impacts the analysts' subsequent assessment of fundamental risk and valuation uncertainty.
Empirical analysis of analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates
This section documents the type of information conveyed by the analyst's ex ante assessment of state-contingent valuation uncertainty about the covered firm. Section 4.1 provides descriptive evidence on the determinants of the spread in analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates. Section 4.2 examines whether these ex ante assessments are related to the absolute magnitude of future base case valuation errors. Section 4.3 provides evidence on whether any relation between Spread i,t and absolute valuation errors is driven by state-contingent shocks to the firms' underlying fundamentals.
Determinants of the spread in analysts scenario-based valuation estimates
Descriptive firm characteristics
To assess whether the range of the analyst's state-dependent valuation estimates reflects the inherent riskiness and/or uncertainty surrounding the distribution of the firm's state-contingent payoffs, we measure firm attributes shown to be related to equity risk and analyst's assessments of firm risk (e.g., Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Fama and French, 1992; Lui, Markov and Tamayo, 2007) . Drawn from Lui, Markov and Tamayo (2007) , these firm characteristics include: Firm size, beta, idiosyncratic risk, book-to-market, leverage, earnings volatility, losses and negative book values. 14 14 There also exists a parallel stream of research that uses historical financial accounting data to assess or predict the riskiness of a firm's equity. Beaver, Ketttler and Scholes (1970) examines the financial determinants of market and accounting betas, and examines whether historical and forecasted accounting betas can predict future return realizations. Rosenberg and Marathe (1975) find that accounting variables improve the ability to forecast systematic risk over using market data alone. Penman (2010) briefly reviews this past literature and discusses how accounting information can be better used for risk assessment, forecasting, and valuation. We use the results from this stream of literature to identify additional firm-specific factors associated with fundamental risk. All multivariate results in the paper are robust to the inclusion of historical return on equity (ROE i,t ), sales growth (Growth i,t ), change in return on equity (∆ROE i,t ) in our full model specifications. These variables are omitted in our tabulated analyses to enhance comparability with the results presented in Lui, Markov, and Tamayo (2007) .
Firm size i,t is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity, measured on the date the analyst report is issued. Beta i,t captures the firm's exposure to systematic market factors, and is estimated from a market model using the weekly equity return realizations (net of the risk free rate) of the firm and the S&P 500 index over the preceding 60 weeks. IdioRisk i,t captures the firm's sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk, and is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of one minus the r-squared from a market model estimated using the weekly equity return realizations (net of the risk free rate) of the firm and the S&P 500 index over the preceding 52 weeks, scaled by the market model r-squared. 
Evidence on the determinants of spread in scenario-based valuation estimates
The descriptive evidence in Table 2 shows that Spread i,t is correlated with attributes typically associated with greater firm risk, yet because many of these firm characteristics are correlated, it is difficult to identify which characteristics directly influence the analyst's assessment of firm risk.
Moreover, because many characteristics are driven by industry affiliation, these correlations do not shed light on whether analysts are incorporating firm-specific attributes into these risk assessments, or simply forecasting risk-return on the basis of industry affiliation alone.
To identify firm-specific factors influencing the analyst's assessment of future risk and valuation uncertainty, we estimate various specifications of the following cross-sectional model:
In these estimations, Industry is an array of nine industry indicator variables based on the firm's GICS sector classification, and Quarter is an array of fifteen quarter-specific indicator variables. These indicator variables are designed to capture the influence of industry affiliation and time period fixed 15 We also present descriptive statistics on the firm's historical return on equity realizations (ROE i,t ), as well as three fundamental performance variables used in our ex post prediction tests -historical sales growth (Growth i,t ), change in return on equity (∆ROE i,t ), and change in operating profit margin (∆Margin i,t ). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 16 The Spearman correlation between Spread i,t and Base Return i,t is 0.097. The correlation between these forecast attributes are not tabulated for parsimony.
effects on the analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates. All estimations utilized pooled, crosssectional data; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. valuation. Finally, these firm-specific relations are incremental to controls for industry affiliation and time-period fixed effects, again suggestive that analysts differentiate risk at the firm level, and jointly utilize firm, industry and market-level (i.e., period specific) information when making these scenariobased forecasts.
These estimations document that analysts' scenario based valuation estimates are systematically associated with firm-specific factors expected to be correlated with fundamental risks and uncertainty surrounding the firm's long run payoffs. The next two sections examine whether these scenario-based valuation forecasts can predict the distribution of the firm's future long-term payoffs.
Analysts' scenario-based valuations and the distribution of one-year-ahead valuation errors
The basic premise behind our prediction tests is that the relative spread in the analysts' scenario- This portfolio-level analysis yields several key results. First, both the analysts' mean anticipated price change (Base Return i,t ) and the standard deviation of these outcomes are increasing in Spread i,t . At this aggregate portfolio level, firms perceived by the analyst community as having greater outcome-based risk are both forecasted to earn higher returns on average and to experience a greater variance in longterm outcomes than firms assessed as possessing less fundamental risk. 17 To illustrate, consider a firm for which there is no uncertainty about the future value and analysts are rational. In that setting, the analyst's three valuation scenarios would yield the same valuation (i.e., Bull i,t = Base i,t = Bear i,t ) and same anticipated price change (Bull Return i,t = Base Return i,t = Bear Return i,t ). Barring any unexpected economic events, realized price will ultimately equal the original value estimate, and as a result, the observed unexpected change in price (Unanticipated Return i,t ) will be zero. As uncertainty increases, the difference between the analyst's bull case and bear case valuation estimates will widen. Assuming no systematic biases in the analysts' base case valuation, realized prices will still be centered at the base case valuation, but ex post price realizations will form a distribution around this central tendency as uncertainty about future firm performance and value resolves itself. For a portfolio of firms with only minimal uncertainty, the distribution of ex post base case valuation errors, Unanticipated Return i,t , will be narrow; for firms with more uncertainty, the ex post distribution will be wider. interquartile range, is generally increasing across these quintiles. This absolute deviation between realized and anticipated returns is an important metric, as it will allow us to examine cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of ex post base case valuation errors at the firm-quarter level.
Multivariate analysis: Spread i,t and the absolute magnitude of base case valuation errors.
To further explore these relations, we estimate various specifications of the following cross- Table 5 presents select coefficients from these estimations of equation (2 changes is increasing in the ex ante risk surrounding the analyst's base case forecast; economically, the estimated coefficients imply that a ten percent increase in the relative spread between bull and base case scenario-based valuation estimates (as a fraction of the base case value) corresponds to an approximate one percent to two-and-a-half percent increase in the mean absolute unexpected return movements over the one year forecast horizon. The documentation of this second moment effect with respect to distribution of future long-term return realizations is precisely the dimension of risk that the scenariobased valuation process is designed to identify. This evidence is especially interesting given that the analyst's base case valuation appears inherently biased. The joint evidence suggests that analysts systematically identify the plausible range of valuation outcomes given the risks and rewards facing the 18 Documented relations and the statistical significance of our key results are robust to the use of a quarterly FamaMcBeth estimation methodology, where standard errors are estimated using the empirically-derived distribution of quarterly coefficient estimations. 19 These results are also robust to the exclusion of all seven quarters impacted by the financial crisis. 20 These results are also robust to logarithmically transforming the dependent variable to control for the impact of heteroskedasticity in the data.
firm, but bias their target price within that band of uncertainty in response to prevailing incentives and/or behavioral biases.
Taken together, the evidence in the preceding two sections suggests that analysts' scenario-based valuation forecasts contain information about the state-contingent risk factors that can affect long-run firm value. This underlying risk manifests itself in terms of the absolute magnitude of base case valuation errors. The next section examines whether the predictive ability is driven by anticipated shocks to the firms' fundamentals.
Relation between analysts' scenario-based valuations and future changes in firm fundamentals.
The predictive evidence presented so far focuses on unanticipated deviations between the analysts base case valuation estimates and realized prices one year after the report's release (i.e., base case valuation errors). If these analyst reports are truly conveying information about state-contingent fundamental risk, the distribution of ex post base case valuation errors should be driven by observable state contingent shocks to the firm's fundamentals. In other words, the predictability of scenario-based valuation outcomes should be arising from the analysts' ability to identify potential economic events that shock the firm's operating performance.
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We provide evidence on this mapping by examining whether Spread i,t is associated with (i.e., predictive of) the magnitude of future innovations in firm fundamentals. For each firm-quarter observation, we calculate one-year-ahead, seasonally-adjusted changes in the covered firm's return on equity, operating margins, and revenue. We expect the absolute value of these one-year-ahead innovations to be increasing across Spread i,t portfolios. Table 6 presents this evidence.
We find that firm-quarters associated with larger Spread i,t are associated with large absolute changes to the firms fundamentals in the year following the release of the analyst report (Panel A). This positive relation is consistent with firms being assessed as inherently riskier subsequently experiencing larger shocks -both positive and negative -to their operations and payoffs over the subsequent four quarters. This positive relation between Spread i,t and the absolute magnitude of these shocks to fundamentals exists for all three metrics of firm performance (ROE, Margins, and Growth). This positive relation is robust to controls for the most recent historical quarterly innovation in each of these absolute realizations, plus industry and quarter fixed effects (panel B). All results are also robust to eliminating firm-quarter observations impacted by the financial crisis. Together, this evidence confirms that the positive relation between Spread i,t and |Unanticipated Return i,t | is driven by analysts' ability to assess the distribution of firm fundamental payoffs in other plausible states of the world.
Impact of the macro-economic shock on the analysts' assessment of state-contingent risk
The preceding analyses document that analysts are capable of assessing and conveying information about state-contingent valuation risk and uncertainty, as captured by the distribution of oneyear-ahead base case valuation errors (i.e. target price errors) and changes in firm's fundamentals. These results are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of analyst, price and financial data impacted by the financial crisis. In the preceding analyses, we are careful to perform robustness tests that excluded the financial crisis data due to concerns that the macro-economic event could potentially confound our inferences about analysts' ability to assess fundamental risk. In this section, we exploit the shock to the US economy to provide additional insights into how analysts' assess fundamental risk and incorporate uncertainty into their scenario-based valuations. Because the financial crisis was a manifestation of statecontingent risk, and generated significant uncertainty about firm performance, the event likely required analysts to explore more deeply the fundamental drivers of firm performance and risk. To the extent that the event revealed new information to analysts, or changed their forecasting behavior, we would expect Spread i,t to be more informative about the firm's risk-return attributes following the event. Our first set of analyses examines whether the financial crisis impacted the ex ante spread in analyst's state-contingent valuations. Our second set of analyses examines whether the financial crisis impacted the predictive ability / information content of the analysts' assessment of state-contingent risk.
Impact of macro-economic shock on the analysts' assessment of valuation uncertainty
We expect the financial crisis to influence Spread i,t though several channels. First, we expect Spread i,t to exhibit inter-temporal variation conditional upon the timing of the analyst report (i.e., before, during or after the financial crisis). Essentially, reports issued at the height of the crisis should display more valuation uncertainty than reports issued before or after the crisis. Second, to the extent that the crisis changed the average analysts' awareness of or sensitivity to macro factors in their valuation process (e.g., recency effect), we would expect to observe larger spreads after the financial crisis than before the crisis. Lastly, any shift in risk assessment should be systematically related to firms' fundamental exposure to macro-economic or state-contingent risks; thus, we expect to observe a shift in the sensitivity of the analysts' assessment of state-contingent valuation outcomes to various firm-specific risk characteristics following the financial crisis.
Consistent with this intuition, the descriptive evidence in Table 1 , Panel C documents that analysts expanded the range of potential valuation outcomes of covered firms in response to the uncertainty created by the macro-economic shock. The effect is strongest in the three quarters at the height of the crisis, with analysts subsequently lowering their assessment after the immediate shock subsides. However, consistent with the financial crisis raising both fundamental risk and analyst awareness after the event occurred, investment reports issued subsequent to the height of the financial crisis continue to contain larger valuation spreads relative to reports issued before the crisis started. This inter-temporal pattern of rising and falling, but not fully reverting, scenario-based valuation spreads is consistent with analysts' dynamically and systematically revising their state-contingent valuation models and assessments in response to macro-economic events.
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To examine whether the sensitivity of analysts' Spread i,t assessments to risk factors and optimism shifted after the start of the financial crisis, we estimate the following cross-sectional model using a subsample of reports issued before and after the start of the financial crisis, respectively:
An investment report is classified as Pre-Financial Crisis (Post-Financial Crisis) if it was issued before (after) the start of the financial crisis, defined as before the fourth quarter (after the third quarter) of 2008.
All estimations utilized pooled, cross-sectional data and standard errors are clustered at the firm level; tests of differences in coefficients between these time periods are based upon a spline regression specification of this model.
Coefficients from the estimations of equation (3) are presented in Table 7 . These estimations, and tests of differences in coefficients, reveal that following the crisis analysts placed an incrementally greater weight on the firm's systematic risk factor (i.e., Beta i,t ), insolvency risk (i.e., negative book value of equity) and extreme leverage (Leverage i,t *Negative BV i,t ). Such a response is intuitive given the nature and form of the financial crisis -a systematic risk event with a material credit risk / credit market component. Interestingly, the financial crisis dramatically lowered the role that the analysts' optimistic target price bias had on their assessment of state contingent valuation risk. Following the crisis, Spread i,t is no longer related to the analyst's optimistic bias, suggesting that the macro-economic event attenuated behavioral biases (or incentives) which adversely affected their ability to assess and/or communicate information about fundamental risk.
Impact of macro-economic shock on the predictive ability of analysts' assessment of state-contingent valuation uncertainty
The natural question is whether the observed shift in the analysts' state-contingent risk assessments following the financial crisis improved the predictability of their scenario-based valuations.
The descriptive evidence in To test these arguments, we estimate the following cross-sectional model using a subsample of reports issued before and after the start of the financial crisis, respectively:
Similar to the preceding analysis, an investment report is classified as Pre-Financial Crisis (PostFinancial Crisis) if it was issued before (after) the start of the financial crisis, defined as before the fourth quarter (after the third quarter) of 2008. All estimations utilized pooled, cross-sectional data and standard errors are clustered at the firm level; tests of differences in coefficients between these time periods are based upon a spline regression specification of this model.
Coefficients from the estimations of equation (4) are presented in Table 8 . These estimations, and tests of differences in coefficients, reveal that after the start of the financial crisis, the absolute value of valuation errors display an incrementally greater association with the analysts ex ante assessment of risk (i.e., Spread i,t ). Moreover, because the analyst placed greater weight on the firm's systematic risk factor (i.e., Beta) after the financial crisis when forming their ex ante assessment, we observe that |Unanticipated Return i,t | is no longer associated with the firm's systematic risk following the crisis. This substitution, where absolute valuation errors are now captured by the analysts' Spread i,t assessment and not a firm fundamental (i.e., Beta), is precisely the pattern that should emerge if analysts are more efficiently incorporating state-contingent macro risk into their scenario-based valuations following the crisis. Additionally, following the crisis, the relation between analysts' optimistic bias and |Unanticipated Return i,t | is significantly weaker, again suggesting that the macro-economic event attenuated behavioral biases (or incentives) which adversely affected their ability to assess and/or communicate information about fundamental risk.
Together, Tables 7 and 8 provide some of the first evidence in the literature on how analyst valuations and risk assessment activities are impacted by and dynamically evolve in response to large macro-economic shocks. This evidence also confirms that Spread i,t is capturing a dimension of risk directly related to the firm's long-run payoffs. Whereas the prior literature (and early institutional risk assessment activities) were focused on mean daily excess stock return volatility, this long-run payoff aspect of our analysis provides a unique insight on the valuation activities of analysts and provides a novel contribution to the extant literature.
Additional analyses and robustness tests
Analyst forecast dispersion versus scenario-based valuation estimates
A commonly used empirical measure to characterize analysts' uncertainty about the firm's future payoffs and firm value is analyst forecast dispersion. Both theoretically and practically, analyst forecast dispersion is fundamentally different than Spread i,t . By construction, forecast dispersion captures disagreement between analysts about a particular firm-level performance construct (e.g., one-year-ahead or two-year-ahead earnings). Such disagreement can arise for many reasons, including uncertainty about the firm's likely future outcomes, but can also arise as a result of differential access to information, difference in the weighting of public vs. private information, the use of different forecasting models, differences in analyst ability, etc. (see Johnson (2004) for a further discussion). Because of these factors, observed forecast dispersion can be attributable to both heterogeneity in analyst attributes and uncertainty about firm fundamentals. Additionally, as an empirical measure, forecast dispersion only provides information about the attributes of the first moment of expected performance under the analysts' base case scenario, with each individual analyst providing no explicit information about performance under alternative states of the world (except to the extent that such beliefs about alternative states drive variation in their base case forecasts). In contrast, the use of analysts' scenario-based valuation estimates to make inferences about fundamental risk and to assess beliefs about the ex ante distribution of payoffs under alternative valuation scenarios avoids many of these confounding factors. The information contained in each individual analyst's scenario-based valuations (i.e., Spread i,t ) reflects his/her assessment of the higher moments of the firm's of potential valuation outcomes at a specific point in time; this attribute allows researchers and investors to observe and measure higher moment beliefs while holding analystlevel attributes constant at the firm-quarter level. Table 9 presents evidence on the relation between future outcomes and analysts' scenario-based valuation attributes after controlling for the contemporaneous level of analyst forecast dispersion. In these tests, Dispersion_FY1 and Dispersion_FY2 are measured as the standard deviation of one-yearahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts, scaled by the consensus FY1 and FY2 earnings forecast, respectively, during the month the analyst report is released. All data on analyst forecasts is gathered from the I/B/E/S consensus database. We require the firm to have at least three earnings forecasts to compute a given forecast dispersion statistic. These analyses reveal several interesting findings. neither measures of analyst forecast dispersion has an incremental association between the distribution of long-run outcomes after controlling for basic firm characteristics. Together, the evidence both casts doubt on the use of analyst forecast dispersion as an empirical proxy for uncertainty about fundamental value and validates our inferences about the type of information being conveyed by the analysts' statecontingent value estimates.
State contingent risk versus short-term volatility
Existing research examining financial analysts' ability to assess risk has exclusively focused on categorical risk ratings. As discussed earlier, the type of risk and uncertainty being captured by an analyst's set of scenario-based valuations is inherently different than the type of risk that manifests itself as daily stock price volatility or the sensitivity of daily returns to risk factors. To provide clarity on this point, we gathered data on "volatility flags" issued by Morgan Stanley analysts and examine the extent to which the analysts' assessments of state-contingent risk reveal information incremental to the issuance of a volatility flag.
Prior to the implementation of the Risk-Reward framework, Morgan Stanley analysts were required to identify risky securities through the issuance of a "volatility flag" in their investment reports. 
In this model, Volatility Flag i,t is an indicator variable equal to one if the analyst had an outstanding "volatility flag" assessment in place at the time a given quarterly investment report was issued, zero otherwise. 24 In particular, the volatility flag was assigned if the analyst estimated that the stock has more than a 25% change of a price move (up or down) of more than 25% in a month, based on a quantitative assessment of historical data, or if she thought the stock was likely to become materially more volatile over the next 1-12 months compared with the past three years. In addition, stocks with less than one year of trading were automatically rated as more volatile (unless otherwise noted).
Select coefficients from these estimations are presented in Table 10 . The first set of columns present coefficients from estimations using the full sample of available data. The second set of column focuses on observations that are not impacted by the financial crisis (i.e., reports issued before Q4 2007).
This smaller, earlier sample of reports also mitigates concerns that later volatility flags are stale and uninformative because of the on-going adoption of the risk-return framework by analysts. 25 The reported coefficients highlight two key results, regardless of sample considered. First, Morgan Stanley's volatility flags were not strong predictors of the variance of long-run base case valuation errors. Second, after controlling for these volatility flags, the spread in the analysts' scenario-based valuations continues to display a strong positive relation with future absolute unexpected price movements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document that analysts are able to assess and identify long-term risk in the form of potential shocks to the firm's fundamentals and the variance of future long-run return payoffs. Our analysis provides several important contributions to the literature. First, these results show that analyst's scenario-based valuation estimates reflect and convey information about the riskiness of the covered firm.
We view our paper as distinct from earlier work on analysts' equity risk ratings and filling a large void in the extant literature on how analysts incorporate information about state-contingent valuation risk into their investment theses. By focusing on a distributional characteristic of actual scenario-based valuation estimates, we are able to gauge the ex post accuracy of an individual analyst's base case forecast and examine whether the magnitude and sign of base case valuation errors are correlated with the form and nature of the analyst's ex ante risk-return assessments. This approach provides greater detail about the link between analyst's risk assessment and future outcomes.
Second, the paper provides an important first step in understanding how an individual analyst assesses the riskiness of the company's fundamentals and incorporates that information into the valuation process through the use of a new set of publicly available data. Our evidence suggests that contextual information about future fundamentals influence the analyst's assessment of the distribution of long-term valuation payoffs. Future research can use this data to explore these issues further, including an examination of how these assessments are differentially shaped by firm, industry, market, and macroeconomic factors across firms and over time.
Lastly, the descriptive data presented in the paper raises numerous questions about the influence of analyst behavioral biases on their assessment of the risk-return potential of covered firms. For example, the mean base case valuation estimate in our sample is not only optimistic, but asymmetrically tilted towards the analyst's bull case valuation. Is such a tilt the result of a selection bias in analyst coverage, an optimistic bias in their forecasts or beliefs, or a natural artifact of the risk-return tradeoff?
Similarly, our descriptive evidence suggest that forecasting behavior changed in response to the recent financial crisis, raising numerous questions about the extent to which analysts' risk and payoff assessments are unduly influenced by recent experience. We believe that the descriptive evidence in our paper will serve as a foundation for interesting and insightful future research about the valuation activities of equity analysts.
Appendix 1 Variable Definitions
The "base case" value forecast contained in the first Morgan Stanley analyst report issued for firm I in quarter t.
Morgan Stanley
Bull i,t
The "bull case" value forecast issued in the first Morgan Stanley analyst report for firm i in quarter t.
Morgan Stanley
Bear i,t
The "bear case" value forecast issued in the first Morgan Stanley analyst report for firm i in quarter t.
Morgan Stanley
Base Return i,t
The expected return (excluding dividends) to investing in the firm at the time of the analyst report, measured as and Price i,t are the closing stock prices on day 365 post-release and on the day before the release of the analyst report, respectively.
FactSet
Unanticipated Return i,t
The unanticipated return to the analyst's base case forecast (excluding dividends) over the one-year interval post-report publication. Beta of the firm relative to the S&P500 (measured as the slope in a weekly return regression over the 60 weeks before the release of the report)
FactSet
IdioRisk i,t Natural log of the ratio (1-R 2 )/ R 2 where R 2 is the R 2 from a regression of weekly firmreturns on the weekly S&P500 returns, measured over the 52 week interval before release of the report Indicator variable equal to 1 if Common equity is negative, and 0 otherwise Worldscope, FactSet
ROE
One-year-ahead, seasonally-adjusted change in ROE, measured as the ROE in quarter t+4 minus and ROE quarter t. ROE is measured as the ratio of quarterly net income available to common shareholders, scaled by average common equity over quarter t.
Worldscope, FactSet Margin
One-year-ahead, seasonally-adjusted change in operating margin, measured as operating margin in quarter t+4 minus operating margin in quarter t. Operating margin is measured as operating income to sales.
Worldscope, FactSet
Growth One-year-ahead, seasonally-adjusted growth in revenue, measured as the ratio of sales in quarter t+4 to sales in quarter t.
Dispersion_FY1
The standard deviation of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts on IBES, scaled by the I/B/E/S consensus FY1 earnings forecast, during the month the analyst report is released.
Dispersion_FY2
The standard deviation of two-year-ahead earnings forecasts on IBES, scaled by the consensus FY2 earnings forecast, during the month the analyst report is released.
I/B/E/S
Volatility Flag
An indicator variable equal to one if the analyst had an outstanding volatility flag on the covered firm at the time the investment report is issued, zero otherwise. The dependent variable, Spread i,t , is the difference between the analyst's bull case and bear case valuation estimates, scaled by the base case valuation, for firm i in quarter t. The first and second columns (denoted Pre-Financial Crisis and Post-Financial Crisis, respectively) present coefficients from estimations using a sample of pre-financial crisis reports (issued before Q4 2008) and post-financial crisis reports (issued after Q3 2008), respectively. The last column presents the difference between the post and pre-financial crisis period coefficients. Differences between coefficients are tested using a spline regression specification. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Tstatistics (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Morgan Stanley
